BY ASLI AYDINTASBAS (SABAH)
Columnist Asli Aydintasbas comments on how fuller Turkish participation might have changed the Iraq war. A summary of her column is as follows:
The US Army has encountered fierce resistance in Iraq. Even after heavy bombing by coalition forces, Saddam Hussein is still alive and controlling Baghdad. The US was planning to bypass the large cities of southern Iraq and proceed directly to Baghdad. However, the coalition forces are now busy clashing with Saddam’s soldiers on the southern front. Washington has become aware that it is not possible to march immediately to the Iraqi capital without engaging these forces. US commanders have recently criticized Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld for developing unrealistic strategies based on the idea that US forces could easily take Baghdad with a limited number of troops. These commanders want at least 100,000 more US soldiers deployed the region. Both the US nation and its media are increasingly dissatisfied and disappointed by the Iraq war, as more American soldiers are dying in this country every day.
That’s why diplomatic circles in Washington are currently asking themselves one important question: ‘How did we lose Turkey’s support?’ They all know that if a northern front had been opened, victory in this war would have been far easier. ‘Losing France’s support was an diplomatic obstacle, but Turkey’s rejection made a great difference in the war,’ said one retired US diplomat. ‘There is no question that if we had a US armored force in northern Iraq right now, the end would be closer.’ Writing last week in US conservative magazine The National Review, Mansoor Ijaz stated that the Bush administration needed to hold Ankara's hand while its new government learns the ropes and decides who its friends are. ‘That is what real allies do in times of war, and the US must shoulder this responsibility,’ added Ijaz. ‘Turkish military calculations about the troops’ strength needed to combat a dilapidated Iraqi army that even the Turks knew they could defeat didn't square with the magnitude of troop deployments and technological capabilities the US had proposed to base in southern Turkey. Translation: The Turks believed Washington had already set its sights on Tehran, and possibly Damascus, for post-Iraq military operations and was casing the battlefield for those theaters.’ Ijaz also mentioned a popular rumor which has recently become popular within US conservative circles: ‘Politics tells an important part of the story. Pressure on Turkey's minority opposition leaders from European Union bigwigs France and Germany during the Turkish Parliament's first vote on Washington's aid-for-bases proposal showed just how politically naïve Turkey's Islamists were. The more experienced opposition took the wedge Jacques Chirac was driving into the trans-Atlantic alliance as an opportunity to negotiate a French policy reversal by offering to reconsider moving up the timetable for Turkey's admission as a full partner to the European Union.’ Last week the Washington Post published another probing analysis of Turkey, the US and the Iraq war. ‘One week into the war, the administration's inability to win Turkey's approval has emerged as an important turning point in the US confrontation with Iraq that senior US officials now acknowledge may ultimately prolong the length of the conflict,’ said the piece co-written by Glenn Kessler and Phillip Pan. ‘It is a story of clumsy diplomacy and mutual misunderstanding, US and Turkish officials said. It also illustrates how the administration undercut its own efforts to broaden international support for war by allowing its war plan to dictate the pace of its diplomacy, diplomats and other experts in US-Turkish relations said.’ The Post writers also argued that Turkey's rejection was especially surprising to administration officials because Turkey has loyally backed US military actions since the Korean War a half-century ago. ‘In retrospect, US officials say, they made unrealistic demands on the new government of Turkey, which was installed only in November, insisting on a vote on whether it would accept as many as 90,000 US troops even as President Bush was still publicly claiming he had made no decision to attack Iraq. US officials repeatedly set deadlines for action, but then took no action when the deadlines passed, costing the administration credibility and inflating Turkey's sense of importance.’ They also quoted a senior Turkish official as saying, ‘We tried very hard to prevent the war. Many believed it was possible. They didn't understand the Bush administration wouldn't listen.’ These pieces should be read by everybody interested in Turkish-US relations.

SOURCE: OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER, DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF PRESS AND INFORMATION