BY SEMIH IDIZ
HURRIYET DAILY NEWS - Historically speaking, Europe has always had a "Turkish problem." In the 19th century this was referred to as the "Eastern Problem." The core issue then concerned the division of the spoils of the Ottoman Empire once its inevitable fall came. The inevitable happened and the "Eastern Problem" was effectively solved after a long and costly period for Turks, with the eventual emergence of modern Turkey in 1923 as an accepted member of the international community. Today we find the West has another version of the "Eastern Problem." But the core of the argument this time is not the spoils from a Turkey on the verge of collapse. The issue rather is where to place a Turkey that is ascendant politically and economically.

Previously the argument was a simple one: Turkey, a weak country, was in the Western orbit and would remain so - albeit at a comfortable distance for Europeans - for its own sake because it knows what is good for itself. This argument has lost its currency now and the proof is the curious dialogue between the US and Europe about "Who lost Turkey?" For US Secretary for Defense, Robert Gates, and Europe is the culprit. He says that Turkey was pushed away from the West by unwelcoming countries and groups in Europe in terms of Ankara's EU bid. There is some truth in this, but it is not the whole truth. Responding to Gates, President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso was quick to blame the US, in turn, as the culprit. Mr. Barroso feels that Ankara started drifting away from its Western allies with the American invasion of Iraq. There some truth in this also, even though it is not the whole truth either. The negative attitude to Turkey in Europe has indeed led Turks across the board to feel that Europeans will always find some excuse or another to block Turkey's path. Today the excuse is Cyprus, tomorrow it will be the Armenian question, the next day it will be something else, as far as the average Turk is concerned. It is no surprise, therefore, that there is a growing tendency in Turkish streets to say, "Let's call the whole thing off," as far as EU membership is concerned. From the American perspective, questions about Turkey started surfacing in Washington after the rude awakening that the Turkish Parliament dished out in March 2003 when it refused to allow US Marines on Turkish soil to invade Iraq from the north. These questions have now reached a climax with Ankara's position on Hamas and Iran.

The bottom line here brings us to what we said above. Previously it was presumed that Turkey would behave in a certain manner because the assumption was that Ankara was beholden to Washington and Europe no matter what. But once Ankara started acting independently, such assumptions were shattered and this has resulted in the debate about where Turkey is going, and who forced it to change course. But this debate - not withstanding the elements of truth in it - is not going deep enough to explain the emerging situation. The "situation" that is "emerging," on the other hand, is not something that is effecting Turkey only but also the US and Europe. Herman van Rompuy, the EU's new "prime minister," who was known in the past for his opposition to Turkey in the EU, appears to have understood this well. He was quoted this week indicating that the global economic, demographic and political strength of the EU and the US would be declining in a stable manner over the next 20-30 years, as new centers of power, including countries like Brazil and Turkey, emerge during the same period. Much the same has been said by many influential Europeans over the past 10 years. It is just that the reality of this basic fact is coming to bear on the public in Europe now, especially after the current economic crisis unfolded.

The global equation is also changing for Washington. For one thing America was forced to go to Iraq alone and illegally at that, as far as the international community was concerned. This was a major blow to Washington as a global power. Secondly, for all the boasting and bragging about "shock and awe" at the time, the military dimension of the invasion turned into a fiasco, and Americans are now clamoring for their government to get their boys back home as soon as possible. This showed that military might alone does necessarily bring about desired results. As for America's economic might, well even that has proved to be not as "mighty" given the economic crisis that resulted in turmoil across the country and highlighted, among other things, just how dependent the Americans have become on "rising powers," the main one being China, of course.

It is clear that in such a world it is not just Turkey, but also Europe and the US that are trying to find a new sense of direction. How to adjust to the post-colonial and post-Cold War world of new centers of economic and political power? This is the question that has to be answered today in Washington and European capitals, and not just in Turkey. The US and Turkey clearly have an interest, no matter what the serious problems they are facing today may be, in maintaining their ties. We will most probably see this happening despite the current coolness in ties.

The EU perspective will also continue to be important for Turkey in terms of being a driving force with regards to reforms and infrastructural modernization. The importance of the economic dimension cannot be overlooked here, either. But the ties between Europe and Turkey are nevertheless more tenuous than Turkish-US ties, and carry less strategic value for Ankara in today's global equation, than ties with Washington do. Economically speaking, on the other hand, Turkey has always looked to the IMF for salvation, and not the EU, during times of economic crisis, and if it is on a better ground today economically than some in Europe, this is because it followed IMF instructions.

If we reverse the coin then, one has to wonder whether Turkey's drifting away from Europe, though not necessarily from the West given its ties with the US and individual European countries, will make the EU stronger or weaker in the long run? This question is even more valid now that minds in Europe are back to thinking about the economy, and how to get it right this time, rather than going on flights of fancy about some kind of a "United States of Europe." The answer may very well be that Europe can make up for what it loses if Turkey drifts away from the continent. There are those who say it can. But there are others who argue that a Europe without Turkey could never become a strategic global power that rivals the US, Russia or China.

History is always the best judge in such debates, of course, and we clearly have to prepare ourselves for new surprises over the next decade, if the past decade is anything to go by. Some, for example, are already claiming today, and George Soros is one of them, that the euro crisis in the EU may even bring down the union itself. Whether people like Soros are trying to create a favorable environment for their own financial speculation is not clear, of course, when they say such things. But if someone like Soros is saying so, whatever his reasons, these remarks inevitably attract attention.

To cut it short then, the debate about Turkey today is a new version of the old "Eastern Question," with the one very important exception that today's Turkey is in this debate from a position of relative strength and not one of total weakness, as was the case a century ago. As for the debate itself, it is as much a debate about where Europe and the U.S. are going, as it is about Turkey.