SAMARRA, Iraq, Oct 5 (AFP) - The US military campaign in Samarra is being hailed as a model for taking back rebel enclaves in Iraq, but the hard work of winning over a hostile or ambivalent population is just beginning.
"We've taken ... one small step and we will have to continue to take small steps," said Colonel Randy Dragon, commander of US forces in Samarra.
"It's not going to happen overnight," he said, commenting on coalition ambitions to convert the formerly rebel-held city into a supporter of the US-backed Iraqi governement.
How soon US troops leave Samarra hinges on whether they can construct a pro-US government and police force to govern the day-to-day affairs after past US efforts to do so ended in failure.
"Everyone has to feel comfortable thing are improving ... that it's being held together," Dragon said a few days after his troops retook the city. The alternative is for Samarra once again to slip back into rebel hands.
Currently, three US military battalions, two 500 to 700-strong Iraqi army and national guard battalions and a 500-member police commando squad are patrolling Samarra, following a four-month period where US troops seldom ventured into the city and insurgents ruled by the gun.
The US and Iraqi forces will soon be reinforced by 1,500 police from Salahuddin province, as the Americans begin the hard work of trying to cobble together a local police force that breaks the mold from its predessor, which was over-run by insurgents.
"Based on the fact they have no police force in Samarra, there will be coalition forces here for quite awhile," US Lieutenant Colonel Eric Schacht said as he surveyed the path ahead.
Colonel Dragon said he envisioned checkpoints for checking military-age men entering the city until next spring when his deployment finishes in Samarra.
In the military's view, success hinges on US forces staying in Samarra until they are confident the general population supports the US-backed city power structure.
Dragon, like his fellow commanders across the country, bets millions of dollars in reconstruction funds can win the vaunted hearts and minds of the country's angry Sunni Muslim population, still embittered by the downfall of Saddam Hussein, whose patronage benefitted them.
"Hopefully, reducing unemployment, creating jobs, quality-of-life projects ... will allow the city to move forward," said Dragon, who has 20 million dollars to spend on Samarra, two million of it immediately available.
But in the bullet-scarred streets, the legacy of the weekend's violence was still being sorted out.
Visiting a sheikh, Dragon urged in his polite official manner a member of the influential Albu Baz tribe to help him bring peace to Samarra. The man leaned toward the colonel and asked loudly: "How can I help when an old man has has gone to pray in the morning and a sniper has shot him."
Whatever soothing words are offered by the Americans, Samarra is still dominated by the fears of its Sunni Muslim community, deeply worried about its place of influence in Iraq that ended with the US invasion.
"They're 95 percent indifferent or don't like what they perceive as the occupation. However, they are not going to do anything about it because they don't want their families hurt," said Captain David Bryant, a 2nd Brigade intelligence officer, estimating the active insurgency at five percent of Samarra's 250,000 people.
Meanwhile, prospects for peace have been complicated by the atomisation of the insurgency, Bryant said. The resistance is no longer cut along lines of Saddam's Baathist power structure. Rebels have countless motives, from Islam to nationalism to pure and simple crime.
"It seems prior to Saddam's capture we focused a lot more on the capture of former regime bigwigs in the Sunni triangle. We've found that other people have now emerged that are not associated with the Baathists. Whether they be religious or criminal or just angry their country is occupied. I'd say the Baathists have faded to the background."
The coalition and Iraq's wanted list in Samarra highlights the range of motives in the new insurgency, according to US and interior ministry officials.
Kamal Hamud al-Suwaidi, known as Kamal the tailor, once had business ties with Saddam's entourage. Since the US-led invasion, Suwaidi declared himself a Wahabbist and has forged ties with Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi's Unity and Holy War faction, which funds him.
Another wanted man is Hussein Ali Muzebar, who trained as a fighter in Afghanistan for three or four years before returning to Iraq around the time of the invasion. He is said to receive money from Al-Qaeda-linked groups, including Zarqawi, and to have plotted car bombings in Samarra.
Haiytham al-Saba, known as The Lion, is a young farmer who vowed to fight the Americans after his brother was killed in the aftermath of the invasion.
Taha Yassem al-Azoze is a Salafist whose family opposed Saddam and had a brother killed by the jailed dictator and has plotted attacks against the Americans.
Abdul Rahman is a criminal who decided to join insurgent activities.
And Najam Abdul al-Takhi al-Nissani is considered part of the insurgency's criminal element. He has published death lists of collaborators and reputedly receives funding from Fallujah and counts as many as 30 followers among his blood relatives.