Colin Powell disclosed in September 2004 that some officials within the US intelligence community had recognized problems with the sourcing behind Iraq war intelligence but withheld those concerns from senior decision-makers.
Powell made the remarks after testifying before a Senate panel. He said certain analysts had circulated internal disclaimers questioning the validity of key sources, yet those warnings never reached the officials drawing conclusions from the same data.
The revelation deepened the fallout from the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, a failure that had already damaged the administration's credibility at home and abroad. Powell had previously acknowledged that the intelligence he presented to the United Nations on 5 February 2003 was "not solid."
Powell backed President George W. Bush's proposal to create a national intelligence director, arguing the role would reduce the risk of critical information being isolated within separate parts of the community. He had indicated earlier that he might not have recommended the invasion had he known Iraq held no such weapons, but continued to defend Bush's decision to proceed.
Historical summary. TurkishPress restated this AFP wire report, first published in September 2004, in its own words.