BY Y. GOKALP YILDIZ
AKSAM- Our process of EU harmonization is continuing to shift the balances of domestic politics. This process will accelerate when Turkey gets a date for EU membership negotiations. Foreign factors will weigh more, and the US-EU rivalry will grow sharper. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) will be the institution most influenced by this process. Its function will be gradually limited to security only, and its influence on the decision-making process will shrink. The interests and aims of the US and the EU meet in wanting to exclude the TSK from the decision-making process. The US considers the TSK an obstacle to the role of ‘moderate Islam.’ The US thinks it can more easily direct an army which is excluded from the decision-making process. The EU has also stated that it considers nationalism an obstacle to bringing Turkey into the Union. It prefers and supports political and social organizations which further its goals. These approaches agree with the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) policies towards the TSK. However, the US and EU viewpoints on the ‘Islamic identity’ issue differ. The US is emphasizing this identity, but the EU doesn’t care for it. The European Court of Human Rights’ (ECHR) recent decision on headscarves is based on this view. In other words, the EU doesn’t consider the strengthening of a political movement with religious leanings favorable to its interests. On the basis of the EU’s support for the AKP, there’s no point in laying a religious groundwork for the ‘reconciliation of civilizations,’ but rather only limiting the TSK’s function and role with the AKP’s political power.
Turkish-EU relations shouldn’t suffer so these things can happen. Europe thinks that if a date for membership negotiations isn’t given to Ankara, the process will be delayed and Turkey will drift away from the EU. The AKP’s future also depends on getting a date. If Turkey gets a date, there will be celebrations here as if we had already joined the EU. The AKP’s massive support will balloon. Early elections could follow. More importantly, such steps as comprehensive constitutional amendments limiting further the TSK’s functions and presidential power will accelerate with this massive AKP support. Relevant institutions will be able to do nothing due to domestic and foreign support for this. However, the EU will make the AKP do these things, but then cut off its support for the party after it’s fulfilled the EU’s purpose.