When President Clinton visited Turkey in December 1999, he won a lot of hearts by visiting the earthquake victims and mingling with the crowds. At one point I believe he even grabbed a baby from the crowd and kissed him to the amazement and delight of many Turks.
President Bush's current trip to Turkey is taking place in a radically different environment of super-tight security and paranoia.
This is the first time ever I've heard that the U.S. Secret Service is taking a special toilet unit to Turkey just for Mr. Bush's private use so that the terrorists won't have access to the presidential fecal matter and thus his DNA. Washington was concerned that such DNA could be used to produce chemical or biological weapons targeting specifically the U.S. President. The security in Turkey is that tight.
Mr. Bush is not a very popular figure in Turkey right now. The majority of the Turks perceive him as a reckless politician who lied his way into Iraq to secure oil and business profits for the fat cats of the American establishment. That's the common perception.
However, no matter what his popularity is, the visit of an American president is still an important event, especially when the troublesome developments in Iraq suggest certain possible consequences that would effect Turkey directly. Hence this visit will certainly witness some tough negotiations between Ankara and Washington.
The exclusive interview President Bush gave to Prof. Ilter Turan of Bilgi University and which was aired on Turkish news channel NTV, gave important clues to what the American position might be on a number of issues. Milliyet's veteran foreign affairs observer Sami Kohen summarized these issues as follows:
1) AKP government signalled that Kurdish "autonomy" in northern Iraq could perhaps be tolerated by Turkey within the framework of an Iraqi Federation only if the United States clears northern Iraq from all PKK presence. Washington does not want to give a solid guarantee that it would do so at a time when it is bogged down in a bloody war in the rest of Iraq. Turkish officials will push hard for America's committment to eradicating PKK from northern Iraq.
2) It looks unlikely that in the NATO Istanbul Summit of June 28-29, Washington will ask for NATO forces deployed to Iraq. President Bush will not ask Turkey to send any troops to Iraq. However, Washington may ask Ankara to provide the necessary logistic and intelligence support to the provisional Iraqi government that will take power on July 1.
3) President Bush will ask the NATO members to increase their committment to Afghanistan. Turkey will probably be asked to expand her participation in the restructuring of Afghanistan -- an offer that Turkey will probably accept gladly.
4) Turkish democracy and the reform packages that the last two governments have passed through the Turkish Parliament will be highlighted as examples to be emulated for the Greater Middle East Project. President Bush's recent call for the European Union to start the full-membership talks with Turkey is a pointer in the same direction.
5) In Cyprus, President Bush has praised the Turkish attitude and criticized the Greek-Cypriot rejection of the April 24 referendum. However, Ankara is still not sure how the United States will help the Turkish side reach an equitable and lasting solution on the island while joining the EU.
Daily Hurriyet's Cuneyt Ulsever brought another macro angle to President Bush's visit by suggesting that, regardless of what the Turks think of Mr. Bush as a person and a politician, they should not forget two things: A) Nations have interests, not friends. B) Turkey does have her trumps cards that she should use courageously and wisely.
Ulsever's top trump card is the American need to control the Middel East oil and the impossibility of doing so on her own. Even though Turkey may not be able to control the fate of northern Iraq, she can neverthless get her share from the control of Iraqi resources by negotiating with America from such a position of strength.
The rest of the story seems to depend on how well the provisional Iraqi government will be able to bring the security situation under control in Iraq, which would effect the degree to which Barzani and Talabani forces will slide towards "autonomy," and which in turn will determine the Turkish response. And here I have not even mentioned the very sensitive issue of Kirkuk yet.
That's why I think that while the NATO Summit in Istanbul is an international event of utmost significance, in terms of impacting Turkey's short-term policy in Iraq and Cyprus, it is probably little more than a sideshow.