What is "Conservative Democracy"?

Etyen Mahcupyan is one of the most exciting political commentators in the Turkish press today. Even though I do not always agree with everything he says, I still regularly read his seminal columns published in the Turkish daily Zaman.
Mahcupyan has been publishing one essay after another for the last three weeks on AKP`s ideological profile, its future chances of making a change in Turkey`s political firmament, and the true meaning of the AKP slogan “conservative democracy.” My own take on the concept of “conservative democracy” is inspired by Etyen`s recent analysis of this unbalanced term that does not stand well to critical inquiry.
As incongruent as the concept of “conservative democracy” sounds, within the Turkish context it is not totally original either. The “conservative modernist” group of Turkish thinkers who lived and produced their best works in the `30s, `40s and `50s could perhaps be regarded as the forefathers of the AKP ideology. The conservative modernists, including the well-known names of Turkish letters, academia and politics like Peyami Safa, Ali Fuat Basgil, Ismayil Hakki Baltacioglu, Mumtaz Turhan, Remzi Oguz Arik, Mehmet Kaplan, Mustafa Sekip Tunc, Hilmi Ziya Ulken, and Yahya Kemal Beyatli, tried to bridge the gap between the “Turkish-Islam synthesis” and the secular and authoritarian republican order. Theirs was a desperate and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to hold on to the “best of the Ottomans” while making amends with the relentless march of modernity and positivism.
By owning up to the concept of “conservative democracy” as an identifier, the AKP obviously is trying to put as much a distance as possible between itself and the pro-Islamist background from which a majority (if not all) of its founders have emerged. “Democracy” is good and to be “conservative” is no crime. So at first glimpse to be a “conservative democrat” sounds like an innocuous mainstream position indeed.
However, a “conservative democrat” is neither a “liberal democrat” nor a “social democrat.” The last two positions emerged from over two hundred years` worth of class struggle in the West. Both liberals and socialists were united in having the “ancien regime” as their common enemy. In that sense, they were both “modernists.” It was none other than Karl Marx who labeled capitalism the “most revolutionary force” in all human history.
Although they agreed in the directionality of the change, the liberals and socialists maintained their differences regarding the political economy of the modernization juggernaut. At the end, the politics of the nation-state in the West succeeded in enveloping both the “left” and the “right” [terms that themselves hark back to the French Revolution] in a power-sharing arrangement that today finds its highest expression in the institutions of the European Union.
“Conservatism” in Europe developed as a reaction to both “liberalism” and “socialism.” A conservative like Edmund Burke sided with King George against the Parliament. Conservatives were dragged kicking and screaming into the parliamentary politics and democratic mainstream by the unstoppable march of capitalism. Against the new market elites (bourgeoisie) and the rise of meritocracy, they defended the entitlements of the past. In their attempt to justify their eroding privileges, the conservatives became the ardent champions of rising nationalism and state power.
The liberal- and social-democrats did not hesitate to appeal to such nationalism and give their full blessings to imperialistic expansions in order to legitimize the political economy of industrialization and band-aid the wounds of a skewed income distribution at home. Conservatives produced a drag in the streamlined body of modernization. But in turn they provided the nationalist ointment that justified the sweat and tears of the millions stoking the furnaces of industry. The liberals, socialists and conservatives co-opted one another remarkably well to serve their own separate class interests and group privileges without toppling the cart. The “politics of interest” managed to create “democracy as electoral struggle.”
This historic backdrop does not help us in understanding AKP`s ideal of “conservative democracy.” The first problem is, there is no discernible “liberal” or “socialist/social-democrat” front in the Turkish politics today in contrast to which AKP could claim to function as a “conservative” ballast.
The principal political task in Turkey today is to reconstruct and occupy the “old center” that once was commanded by People`s Republican Party (`30s and `40s), Democrat Party (`50s), Justice Party (`60s) and ANAP (`80s).
Turkish social scientists dating back to late Idris Kucukomer have correctly identified this center as a statist and unitarian platform even when the actors that occupied it in the past identified themselves as “liberal” (e.g. DP, AP, ANAP), “nationalist” (e.g. CKMP, MHP), “socialist” (i.e. TIP, IP) or “social-democrat” (e.g. CHP, SODEP, SHP) parties. Even Necmettin Erbakan`s MNP, MSP (shared power for 3.5 years during the `70s) and RP (which came to power in 1996), despite all its anti-establishment fever and rhetoric, proved to be as statist and centrist as all the other ruling parties that preceded it. Some truly divergent formations like Turkish libertarians (a la Besim Tibuk) or the grass-roots “civil society” movement once spearheaded by Cem Boyner whithered away in the bud, with no chances of making a dent in the political process.
In the absence of truly “liberal” or “social-democrat/socialist” wings in Turkish politics, AKP`s “conservatism” boils down to a rejection of all class/group based “interest politics” which is the rule in the West, and a claim to represent the “whole nation", instead of, for example, only those who voted for AKP. This ANAP-like inclusiveness of course reflects the lessons learned from Erbakan`s RP fiasco. It signals a principled decision to preserve the peace with the Turkish civilian and military secular establishment. AKP`s “conservatism” is not a political program developed in counterpoint to “liberalism” or “social democracy.” It is more of a code word signaling the new elite`s determination to survive politically without upsetting the boat.
As to the “democrat” in “conservative democracy,” that is another code concept that signals AKP`s determination to preserve and bolster its cultural constituency with the momentum of globalization. The values like “universality,” “cultural diversity,” “religious tolerance,” “pluralism,” “localization,” “free enterprise,” “privatization” and “civil society” have been the ideological underpinnings of economic globalization. Thus more “democracy” in the sense of increased openness to global processes and standards, higher integration with transnational organizations and an increased willingness to yield to the dictates of international jurisprudence sets AKP apart from all the other parties that unite in their anti-international and anti-globalist stance. “Democracy,” in this sense, reflects AKP`s desire to participate in the “global modernity project" and protect its cultural base. Its challenge is to continue this unfolding towards and integration with globalization without damaging the “nationalist contract” that legitimizes its power-sharing at the center.
This is why the “democrat” in AKP`s “conservative democracy” perhaps has more real substance than its “conservatism.” Mahcupyan, however, argues that since neither liberalism nor socialism could find a remedy to the ills of modernization, to the extent that AKP participates in globalization as a “conservative democrat actor” it will not be able to offer new solutions to the challenges facing Turkey today.
The implication is that there needs to be a “third way” and AKP does not represent it. Although it lined itself up both with the statist establishment domestically and the forces of globalization externally, AKP is far away from developing a truly alternative platform to solve Turkey`s urgent socioeconomic issues within democracy, is what Mahcupyan seems to be arguing. In other words, “the center remains the good old center” although it is now occupied by AKP.
In this line of reasoning the globalization is taken as a given. However I think there is some merit to the discussion started by John Ralston Saul in the March 2004 issue of the Harper`s Magazine that the “collapse of globalism and the rebirth of nationalism” is at hand.
If that is the case, how would the collapse of globalism impact AKP? Would the “rebirth of nationalism” catch AKP in a political cross-fire if Turkey`s EU process does not proceed as planned this year? What are the conditions of an ultra-nationalist movement arising from the AKP experience? How would all this be effected if AKP wipes away the competition in the upcoming March 28 local elections and garners more than 50% of the votes? Would a deepened electoral mandate benefit AKP`s “conservatism” and “democratic” bend in equal measures?
These are some of the questions I`ll be thinking and writing about in the days and weeks ahead.