The unification process in Cyprus brought to a head several serious political issues in Turkey that were kept under wraps for many decades.
The civilian leadership’s relation to the military is one of them. In the Turkish National Security Council (NSC) meeting of January 24, the NSC recommended that the government treat the Annan Plan as a “reference” and consider the “facts on the ground,” an oblique pointer to Turkey’s guarantor status and the 30,000 Turkish troops on the island who currently enforce that status. However, the AKP government in effect accepted the Annan Plan in substance and not just as a “reference.”
What’s more, the AKP government has also accepted the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s prerogative to “fill in the blanks” in case neither the two Cypriot communities nor the Turkish and the Greek governments reach an agreement by March 22. This means that when the dust settles down one way or the other by May 1, the “facts on the ground” will certainly reflect Annan’s choices but not necessarily those of the Turkish NSC. They still may. But not necessarily.
Technically of course the NSC is a “consultative body.” But according to the Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution, Turkish cabinets are required to grant a “priority consideration” to the “views” formulated by the NCS. All Turkish observers know that NSC’s security- and foreign-policy related suggestions have always been taken very seriously and implemented with little changes by all past governments.
In its effort to satisfy the EU concerns regarding the military’s weight in Turkish politics, AKP assigned new civilian members to the NSC. Then came this latest break with the past precedent in the form of ignoring the NSC’s January 24 recommendation concerning the Annan Plan.
Switch in NSC policy ?
Turkish Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Ugur Ziyal, who led the Turkish delegation during last week`s New York talks, is reported by daily Hurriyet saying that the decision to let Annan “fill in the blanks” was taken with full blessings of the Turkish General Staff. If that is true, then there has been a remarkable switch in NSC policy between Jan 24 and Feb 10, and that also reflects the AKP government`s control over the Cyprus negotiation strategy.
Drums banging loudly
However, despite Turkish General Staff`s reported concurrence with the bold steps taken in Cyprus, a wide front of AKP detractors has already started to bang the drums loudly with frequent references to the “traitors” who are “giving Cyprus away” just to join the EU and thus provide a protective umbrella for AKP’s allegedly “Islamist agenda.”
There are “reminders” even by supposedly liberal-minded columnists and some political leaders who have served Turkey for decades at the highest possible levels that “chaos” may ensue if AKP continues with its alleged “give it away and get done with it” policy. The same sources continuously remind that “this country’s real owners are not asleep” and that they can “intervene” whenever it’s necessary.
A well-known and retired ambassador accused AKP leadership with “betraying the nation’s just cause.” Another retired ambassador with solid social-democratic credentials, in a recent column he wrote for a center-left Turkish daily, has asked the Turkish foreign-affairs correspondents in effect to censor themselves (although he didn`t exactly put it that bluntly) since some of their quotations from the U.S. officials “revealed too much” on sensitive diplomatic issues and “offended” Turkish sensibilities.
The alarm bells are ringing on all sides because they all know this time around, in contrast to all the past Cyprus negotiations, there’s no going back. This time the arrow has really left the bow and the possibility of making a bad mistake is eating away at the Turkish subconsciousness.
Many Turks see themselves as the successors to an empire that has constantly lost territory since the 1820s. The way Crete was turned over to Greece by a treaty signed in 1913 still gives heartache to many nationalists. So the popular perception of "losing Cyprus" has a tremendous explosive energy that should not be taken lightly. There is much public relations work ahead awaiting the AKP before and after May 1.
AKP proves observers wrong
Back in early 2002 many Turkish observers, this writer included, regarded AKP as yet another pro-Islamic party like Refah or Fazilet that preceded it, not because of AKP’s party program but due to the pro-Islamic tenure track of most of its founders.
But since then two things happened: people who cannot in any way be categorized as “pro-Islamic” on the basis of their past records started to join AKP and enter the Parliament as AKP deputies after the November 2002 elections. PM Erdogan’s foreign-policy senior adviser Egemen Bagis is one good example. State Minister Ali Babacan and Culture Minister Erkan Mumcu are among other such names.
And secondly, AKP started to follow a progressive main-stream program both domestically and in foreign-affairs. The government kept on paying homage to all the correct objectives (like fighting corruption, respecting human rights, joining the EU, pressing on with privatization) endorsed by virtually all the past Turkish governments.
A new ANAP?
AKP emerged as the new owner of Turkey’s collapsed political center by winning the allegiance of voters who might have voted for any other party in the past. Instead of becoming the continuation of Necmettin Erbakan`s pro-Islamic Refah Party, the AKP rapidly entered a track that may end up creating "a second ANAP," the dominant party of the `80s founded by the late Turgut Ozal.
ANAP, accommodating four different political factions under its umbrella (center-liberal, nationalist, religious-conservative and Kemalist-social-democrat), ushered in a new era of liberalization in economy and politics that has changed Turkey considerably in many ways. However, when Ozal entered into the fray of the First Gulf War as an ally of the United States hoping that “we will invest one but harvest three” Turkish economy suffered greatly.
Two challenges
Today AKP is facing two important challenges that Ozal’s ANAP did not have to deal with.
The first is the change in the international context. The Ozal period, the ‘80s, was the heyday of Globalization with a capital “G.” The market mechanism and the corporate rationality were expected to benefit the populace of the nation-states if they participated in the global exchange through “austerity programs” rigidly enforced by the International Monetary Fund.
But in this day and age of “sourced-out jobs” and endless corporate scandals there is a serious nationalist backlash to globalization. Countries like Malaysia and Chile have already proven what can be achieved by harnessing economic decisions back to the yoke of nationalist politics. This may limit AKP government`s maneuverability in the foreign capital markets and hamper its determination to continue with the privatization of state utilities, services and telecommunication concerns. But that is the topic of another column.
At the mercy of EU
Cyprus is the second tough challenge that Ozal did not have to deal with. After May 1, AKP will be totally at the mercy of the EU. If the EU issues a firm and “reasonably close” date for Turkey`s membership on or before December 2004, then PM Erdogan can boast like Ozal never could: “We have invested one and harvested two.”
However, if the EU denies a date for Turkey, or if the date turns out to be so far off into the future (like “2020,” for example) that it is perceived as a “no date” by the Turkish public opinion, then AKP will be in trouble.
In such a worst-case scenario the accusations of “selling out Cyprus” will reach deafening heights. There will be many accusers wagging their fingers at AKP in a classic I`ve-told-you-so moment of bitter vindication. And since there are three or four ANAP-like fault lines within AKP, the party may start to crack under the strain and split into groups, each more radical than AKP itself. That`s why I believe EU is holding the key to AKP`s future.
Mixed signals from EU
The signals from EU are mixed. Yes, many EU officials including Romano Prodi have expressed their delight at the rapid progress the AKP government has made in continuing with the reform packages initiated first by the Ecevit government. However, it is far from clear that the "EU date" is a forgone conclusion.
The German Christian Democrat Union Party (CDU) leader Angela Merkel, for example, who has visited Turkey just a few days ago, has proposed a “privileged partnership” status for Turkey. PM Erdogan immediately rejected the notion and said “there is no such privileged partnership on the agenda of Turkey. No such thing can be in question.”
If the EU is fishing in murky waters trying to catch a deal that would appear to satisfy Turkey`s hunger for full-membership while actually denying it, it won`t happen anytime soon. Turkey knows exactly what she wants; she is determined to do whatever is necessary (within certain limits) to get it; and she will accept no substitutes. Observe Cyprus.
Will EU shoot herself in the foot?
The EU has the power to damage AKP by diluting the membership process even after the Cyprus issue is resolved satisfactorily on May 1. However, in this post-Sept-11 era, that`s when EU would also shoot herself in the foot because EU would then lose all its ideological integrity in the eyes of the Islamic world. That much is for sure.
But beyond that, EU would also suffer in real terms by losing the most crucial link that connects NATO, the European Union, “Greater Mideast Project” and the Caucasus oil to one another: Turkey.
That`s why I see the Cyprus issue as much a test of AKP`s survival as EU`s maturity and integrity. I hope the EU leaders have the wisdom to go beyond narrow local concerns and reap the most out of the Cyprus resolution by issuing a firm and close date on which Turkey can start her full-membership talks with the Union.