By YUSUF KANLI
TURKISH DAILY NEWS- It's not at all compatible with the notion of democracy. Nor is it easy to subscribe to the idea that there is no alternative to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) administration in the country. Still, most Turks have been stressing that under the prevailing conditions, the only alternative to the AKP is the AKP itself.
This is a very dangerous situation, for Turkish democracy to have a ruling majority to which there is no alternative, which could land the country in a serious deadlock paving the way to totalitarian tendencies in governance. Are we seeing signs of this? The rigid, uncompromising `I'm the boss, I set the rules' understanding of the AKP leadership might all be indications of an exhausted administration after almost five years in office. However, at the same time the same factors show the impact of the absence of a credible political alternative to the democracy perception of the ruling group. For good governance in a democratic country, having a strong, credible opposition is as fundamentally important as having a strong, capable executive. Be they the `armed forces' or the `unarmed forces' -- like the `civilian force' of big business, labor groups and women's groups in the country in the Feb. 28, 1997 process, the so-called postmodern coup period -- extraneous elements should not be allowed to step into politics and play a decisive role in a manner replacing the key players of democracy, the political parties.
Thus, the problem of today's Turkey is not the absence of a strong political force in government, but rather the lack of a credible opposition which can pose a challenge to the governing party and thus offer a democratic alternative to any possible quest for change the population might have.
All the surveys indicate that in going to the polls Turks will not only consider their political allegiances, but at the same time and perhaps more than their political inclinations they will shape their vote to contribute to the country's economic and political stability. As long as there is no clear indication that any of the existing political opponents of the AKP can come to power and maintain stability in the country, many Turks who under normal conditions wouldn't even think of voting for the AKP or an Islamist-rooted party will be voting for the AKP, taking into consideration the immense suffering and instability during the 2000-2001 period and the consequent economic-financial crisis that ripped almost 60 percent of the wealth away from the population in a few months.
Thus, unless the AKP makes a big mistake, it may even boost its vote to over 40 percent in the next elections and return with a very high parliamentary majority, though it might lose some seats to independent pro-Kurdish candidates in the southeast, and a possible third and fourth party getting over the 10 percent national threshold might diminish their parliamentary advantage.
Who will be the next president and who heads the AKP in the election campaign period will of course be decisive on the overall election performance of the AKP, but the real problem will be the growing polarization in the country along Kemalist-nationalist and Islamist lines. If the AKP, with its own mistakes, starts giving an impression that even if with an overwhelming majority in Parliament it won't be able to maintain political and economic stability -- because of the possible intervention of non-political forces in politics of the country -- then the electorate will have to create a new alternative and vote for that in the polls. In this framework, even if no credible opposition grouping can be forged before the polls, one of the existing parties will start to emerge as the alternative.
After all, we should never forget that when the AKP came to power in November 2002, it was only nine months old. Thus, the AKP's alternative cannot be the AKP, and Turkey has the potential to produce a credible alternative if compelled.