by Ugur Akinci, Ph.D.

http://tork.blogspot.com

The new year ahead will be one of those pivotal years for the Turkish Republic. Similarly crucial years that immediately come to mind are 1938 (Ataturk's death), 1950 (landslide victory of anti-establishment Democrat Party and the onset of multi-party politics), 1952 (Turkey becomes NATO member), 1960 (coup), 1971 (coup), 1979 (collapse of the Turkish economy), 1980 (coup), 1983 (liberal ANAP comes to power), 1984 (PKK launches its terrorism campaign), 1994 (landslide victory of pro-Islamist candidates in municipal elections), 1996 (Turkey signs the Customs Union agreement with EU), 1999 (capture of PKK leader Ocalan), 2002 (victory of religious-conservative AKP in general elections).

Developments in Cyprus and Iraq will either propel the nation towards an era of enhanced integration with the “West” in general and the European Union in particular, or inaugurate a period of nationalistic withdrawal behind walls of political isolation.

The ongoing fight against international terrorism will be the third dynamic impinging upon domestic and foreign policy.

Here, in a nutshell, are the Turkish positions on these two major foreign policy issues and the tough odds Ankara is facing:

Cyprus

Turkish position:

  1. Cyprus issue must be resolved. Loneliness of Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots in the world on this issue must come to an end, but not at the price of “losing Cyprus.” Public perceptions are extremely important in keeping the process at an even keel.
  2. Turkey's guarantorship status and the presence of a credible Turkish force on the island must continue to protect the Turkish-Cypriots against the kind of ethnic-cleansing campaigns sprung on them twice by the Greek-Cypriots in 1963 and 1974.
  3. Return of the Greek-Cypriots to North and compensation for the properties previously owned by the Greek-Cypriots must be managed in such a way to prevent the meltdown of Turkish-Cypriot economy and ethnic identity.
  4. The Annan Plan must be open for negotiations. The “Annan Map” must be modified to give Guzelyurt and other core economic assets back to the Turkish-Cypriots.
  5. Resolution of the Cyprus issue must not be indexed to Turkey's possible full-membership in the EU.

Hard facts:

  1. EU is determined to go ahead with the full-membership of Greek-Cyprus, starting as of May 1, 2004. The Greek threat to veto the membership of other EU candidates forces Brussels to plow through with the process. If a satisfactory formula is not found in 2004 for unification of the island, Turkish forces will be portrayed as occupying the territory of a European country. This will give rise to significant diplomatic and political complications that Turkey will have to deal with.
  2. Even if Turkey agrees to a unification formula, there are no guarantees that in the December 2004 EU summit Turkey will be given a firm date on which full-membership talks can commence. That would explode like a political hand grenade in the ruling AKP's lap if the connection between resolution of the Cyprus issue and Turkey's EU membership is assumed to be a foregone conclusion.

“Who lost Cyprus?,” a terrifying question that thankfully did not have to be asked yet, is not the kind of inquiry that too many Turkish governments can face and yet survive politically. The Turkish public opinion must be hardened by December 2004 to carry on with the EU process even if Turkey's application is “reconsidered” in the aftermath of a unification on the island. That takes leadership. And I believe the AKP does have the legitimacy and popular support (at least for now) to weather a possible storm provided it can control the opportunistic sniping from its own nationalist flank as well as that of the secularist establishment from outside.

Window of opportunity:

The Greek-Cypriots are against the Annan Plan. In various occasions the Greek-Cypriot leadership did not hide the fact that they would have rejected the plan due their disagreements on more than 70 points even if the Turkish-Cypriot side said “yes.”

However, when TRNC President Denktas went ahead and rejected the Annan Plan in a wholesale fashion as “suicidal” and even “immoral,” the Greek-Cypriots were offered a golden opportunity to have their cake and eat it too – namely, they could avoid the Plan (which foresees a significant power-sharing arrangement between the South and the North) without even objecting to it and pass on all the blame to the Turkish-Cypriot side. They had a free ride, compliments of the TRNC leadership.

The Turkish side can now call off the Greek-Cypriot bluff and expose their disingenuous approach by agreeing to sit down at the negotiation table. That way, in case of a failure, the Turks would have a more credible stance to prevent indexing Cyprus to Turkey's EU membership. And in case of a success, they would of course have even a stronger hand to expect assignment of a firm-date for EU membership negotiations in December 1994.

Iraq

Turkish position:

  1. Turkey would like to see the continuation of a unified secular Iraq, ruled by a representative government in Baghdad, elected democratically.
  2. “Autonomy” for the Kurdish North and Shiite South is in line with Turkish national interests in the region, but a “federative Kurdish state,” or an independent Kurdish state are not. Hasan Cemal, in his best-seller book “Kurtler,” shares how a Turkish general expressed his opinion in mid-90s that such a Kurdish state would constitute a “cause for war.” Many Turks are afraid that such independence may re-kindle the flames of separatist violence and PKK/KADEK terrorism in Southeastern Turkey.
  3. The Turkish establishment is determined that, no matter what happens, PKK/KADEK cannot be allowed any support or bases within Northern Iraq. This is number one strategic imperative that drives the Turkish policy regarding Northern Iraq and continues to justify the Turkish military presence within the “buffer zone” in the Iraqi side of the Turkish-Iraq border.
  4. Ankara also feels that the oil-rich Northern city of Kerkuk cannot be recognized as a “Kurdish city” and left totally under the control of a Kurdish administration. The city has been a Turkish city in the past. The rights and collective security of over 2 million Turcomans living in Northern Iraq must protected. This is a second strategic imperative that drives Turkish policy towards northern Iraq.

Hard facts:

  1. Jalal Talabani's left-of-center Patriotic Unity of Kurdistan (PUK) and Masoud Barzani's tribal-based conservative Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) have already gone a long ways towards full independence during the last 12 years, thanks to the Turkish-based Operation Northern Watch which provided a secure air shield over Northern Iraq and protected the Kurds from Baghdad's retaliation.

    Today the Kurds of Northern Iraq have a functioning Parliament, a flag, an army, schools and hospitals, a functioning bureaucracy on state payroll, and most importantly, a track record which proved to themselves that Kurds can govern themselves effectively under the security blanket provided by the West. They are now aggressively seeking foreign investments even while the future of Iraq is still negotiated by the parties.

    In the aftermath of the First Gulf War, the Turkish government made a wise strategic decision to co-opt the PUK and KDP's cooperation instead of tackling the fledgling Kurdish administration head on.

    Strengthening the local Kurdish administration as a viable economic unit was a solution to three different problems at one stroke: 1) The massive migration of Iraqi Kurds into Turkey could be prevented. 2) The economy of Southeast Turkey, brought to a standstill with the 1991 Gulf War, could be provided a new shot in the arm with the revived truck commerce across the border. 3) PKK/KADEK could best be contained within Northern Iraq with the active cooperation of PUK and KDP.

    Both Talabani and Barzani traveled numerous times to Turkey starting back during late Ozal's tenure -- with red passports issued by Ankara one might add. The Turkish government even encouraged and provided technical assistance for the establishment of a Kurdish TV station in Northern Iraq.

    So it is too late for Turkey to withdraw its strategic help to bolster Kurdish autonomy in Northern Iraq. I also believe it still is to her best national interests to have a stable administration across its southern border which would be accountable for security infractions within its territory. The three reasons for co-optation are still valid.

  2. From a military point of view, the new situation in Northern Iraq could not be any different from what it was just nine or ten months ago. Now any Turkish military measures targeting Northern Iraq will find the U.S. Fourth Infantry Division and U.S. special forces at the receiving end, and not only the Kurdish peshmergas.

    The humiliating episode six months ago during which a dozen Turkish special force members were arrested by the American troops in the Kurdish region and summarily dispatched to Baghdad with hoods over their heads before they were released was a power move intended to remove any ambiguities that might have existed regarding who's calling the shots these days in Iraq.

    I don't believe Turkey ever had any military designs over Northern Iraq to start with, despite the cross-border operations in hot pursuit of the PKK and despite some loose talk during late Ozal's time about “rethinking Mosul and Kerkuk.”

    However, a military option now is not possible either even if that was the intention.

  3. The real factor that will tip the Kurdish decision towards “autonomy” within a federative structure or full independence perhaps depends on neither the Kurds nor the Turks. As Yasemin Congar, daily Milliyet's Washington bureau chief, has pointed out in her excellent column this past Monday (December 29), it really depends on what the Shiites will decide to do.

    If the Shiites in the South decide to protect Iraq's unified secular structure and take their place within a federative state, then the Kurdish autonomy can proceed within parameters that would bring comfort to Turkish policy makers.

    But if the Iraqi Shiites go for an Iran-inspired mad dash for an independent “Islamic Republic of Iraq,” then PUK and KDP will be hard forced to answer in kind given the fact that the Kurdish leaders have already made it clear that they could not co-exist with such a non-secular Islamic formation.

    Let's hope that the Kurds, Turcomans, Sunni and Shiite Arabs of Iraq will agree on a unified federative and secular Iraq as an “optimal” solution. That would be best for Turkey as well.

    A breath-taking year for the whole region is ahead of us. May it bring peace, understanding and prosperity to all the Turks, Turcomans, Kurds, Greeks, Iraqis, Israelis, Arabs, Palestinians, Iranians, Azeris, Armenians and Georgians living in the region.