Confusion in Cyprus – The “Annan Plan”

By Ugur Akinci, Ph.D.
http://tork.blogspot.com

The Turkish public opinion, both in the island and the mainland, is split into two regarding the “next step” in Cyprus: those who want the perpetuation of the “status quo” despite the fact that Greek-Cyprus will become a full member of the European Union (EU) on May 1, 2004, and those (like Turkish PM Erdogan) who favor “negotiating” the “Annan Plan,” named after U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and shaped in 2002 after the Swiss Canton system.
The Plan is a favorite of the United States as well despite the fact that U.S. State Department`s Special Coordinator for Cyprus Thomas Weston, in an interview he gave to Turkish SKY TV, reportedly said that he was “confused” about what would happen next in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in the near future.
The “confusion” in question is probably arising from the stalemate between the ruling and the opposition blocs that the last TRNC election has yielded. But the Plan itself also contains provisions that contribute to that confusion.
It is not possible to understand the Turkish ambivalence in taking the “next step” without reminding ourselves some of the Turkish objections to the Annan Plan.
Turkish objections:
1) Annan Plan gives Guzelyurt (Morphou), a city currently inside the territory of the TRNC, to the Greek-Cypriots. Since the fertile orchards of Guzelyurt provides about 65% of TRNC`s annual GNP, losing Guzelyurt is tantamount to an economic meltdown for the Turkish-Cypriots.
2) According to Turkish observers, the Plan also favors Greek-Cypriots in ownership of the scarce underground water resources. Losing such precious economic resource would be another additional blow for TRNC.
3) The Foundation Agreement of the Plan (Appendix A), foresees a bi-zonal state, without mentioning the equally important principle of “bi-communality.” Many Turkish-Cypriots believe that if bi-communality is not honored, i.e. if Greek-Cypriots are allowed to migrate and settle in Northern Cyprus, due to their numeric superiority the Turkish-Cypriots will eventually lose their economic dependence and collective security.
Over 40,000 Greek-Cypriots returning to the North might create new social tensions. The ruling TRNC parties favor keeping two ethnic communities with different languages and religions and a bitter past, separate in a bi-zonal and bi-communal arrangement.
The fact that the Plan sets a ceiling of 1% in the first year and 20% in the twentieth year for the “residents hailing from he other side” does not seem to provide enough psychological buffer for the Turkish-Cypriots.
4) Under the Plan there will be a single Cypriot citizenship, a single government with Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot “sides.”
Turks, on the other hand, demand a confederation in which Turks and Greeks would have their own separate states, with their own governing bodies, collecting their own taxes a part of which is diverted to the “confederal state” formed in a political no-man`s-land in between -- similar to the status of District of Columbia in the United States.
5) Cyprus will be demilitarized, which will require the removal of about 30,000 Turkish troops from the island including their tanks and artillery.
However, the Plan does not mention anything about the two important British military bases and listening posts in Greek-Cyprus, Dikelia and Akrotiri. “Why should we remove our forces when the British continue to keep theirs?” is a question one hears asked in the Turkish press.
“If the island is a strategic military post for Great Britain, it is ten times more so for Turkey,” goes the justifiable argument.
6) The new maps reduce the Turkish-Cypriot territory to 28% of the island and leave mostly the rocky Karpat mountains to Turks.
Moreover, by re-drawing the border in terms of a series of finger-like protrusions, the new map chops up territorial contiguity and removes the strategic straight-line communications between Lefkose and other Turkish-Cypriot population centers.
(For alternative maps proposed by the Plan see: MAP A, MAP B)
Positive side:
The Annan Plan is not all negatives. It has some positive aspects as well, thus contributing to the “confusion” of those Turks and Turkish-Cypriots who are trying to find a way out of the current impasse on the island:
1) The Plan recognizes the original Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance. These treaties will “remain in force and shall apply mutatis mutandis to the new state of affairs,” says Article 1 of the Plan.
Since the devil is always in the details, the “devil” in this case might be lurking in the phrase “mutatis mutandis.” But that`s why lawyers are born and the good ones know their Latin. Things can be negotiated.
2) The Plan has a positive language, giving the impression that at least some lessons were learned from the past:
“Cyprus shall maintain special ties of friendship with Greece and Turkey, respecting the balance established by the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance and the Agreement, and as a European Union member state shall support the accession of Turkey to the Union. (Article 5).”
3) The principle of “political equality” over which many Turkish lives were lost in the past is acknowledged explicitly in the Plan:
“... Acknowledging each other`s distinct identity and integrity and that our relationship is not one of majority and minority but of political equality; (Article iii)”
4) The Plan proposes a bi-cameral parliament consisting of a 48-member Senate and 48-member Chamber of Deputies. Half of the Senate seats are allocated to Turkish-Cypriots (who form 25% of the total population). So there is good parity at legislative level as well.
5) Articles on power-sharing makes an attempt to balance the executive profile of both sides by proposing that “the leaders of the two sides shall become Co-Presidents of Cyprus for three years. The Co- Presidents shall exercise the executive power during the first year, assisted by a Council of Ministers they shall appoint. For the following two years, the executive power shall be exercised by a Council of Ministers elected by Parliament, and the Co- Presidents shall together hold the office of Head of State.”
What happens after the first three years is not clear. Enter negotiations.
6) “An independent, impartial Reconciliation Commission shall promote understanding, tolerance and mutual respect between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.
The Commission shall be composed of men and women, comprising an equal number of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, as well as at least one non-Cypriot member, which the Secretary-General of the United Nations is invited to appoint in consultation with the two sides.”
This is not too bad an idea either.
The real strategic story
In this brief news analyses I`ve tried to highlight the main pros- and cons- of the Annan Plan. A real thorough analysis obviously requires a much longer treatment, probably by a Cyprus scholar with a degree in international law. I am neither.
However, as a long-time observer of the Cypriot drama, I`d like to mention another less-spoken aspect of this whole issue: the strategic long-term consequences of losing Turkey`s proximate control on the island.
1) The island is a top-value military-strategic asset that controls much of the traffic in Eastern Mediterranean, all the sea lanes between Europe, Turkey, Israel, Egypt and the Suez Canal.
Situated only 65 kilometers from Turkish shores, such an asset would be a grave threat to Turkey if in any time in future it is perceived to be controlled by interests opposing the Turkish national interests.
The militarization of most of the Dodecanese Islands by Greece in violation of the articles of the Lausanne Treaty and the bloody attempt in July 1974 to annex the island to Greece give Turkey reason for such concern.
2) Oil is perhaps another rarely spoken factor why Turkey is reluctant to let go of all control on the island.
There are apparently rich oil deposits under the waters between TRNC and Turkey. Unification of the island would curtail greatly Turkey`s involvement in the extraction and sale of such a precious resource.
Cyprus is also important in controlling the sea lanes leading to the Bay of Iskenderun and the Yumurtalik, Mersin region – the point at which the still-under-construction Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline will terminate.
That`s another reason why Turkey wants to guarantee that the political interests that rule Cyprus in the future will be an ally but not an adversary.
Amb. Weston is not alone in his confusion. Many Turks are also confused for the reasons some of which I`ve tried to outline above.
The current stalemate in TRNC politics may actually present an opportunity to break through this confused state of affairs by providing President Denktas the support of a wider coalition with which he can sit at the negotiation table, as favoured by the AKP government in power in Ankara.
Historic responsibility of EU
However, the European Union calendar ticking away relentlessly towards the full-membership of Greek-Cyprus on May 1, 2004 is a major reason why probably there won`t be enough time to resolve all Turkish concerns.
If and when EU goes through its calendar even when the Plan is still up in the air, the current “confusion” may leave its place to something worse.
That`s why the heaviest historic responsibility in resolving this dangerous stalemate does not rest on the Turkish, American, Greek or Cypriot shoulders. It rests in Brussels.
The pressure cooker in this small cramped and steamy kitchen might be hard to fix. But EU is the one turning up the flames all the way high, up to the maximum setting.
EU can give the cooks some time to settle their differences over the Annan recipe by turning down the flames a little and postpone Greek-Cyprus` accession to the EU.